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ABSTRACT
This paper traces the developments that have contributed to the importance of risk in 
regulation. Not only does it consider theories associated with risk, it also discusses 
explanations as to why risk has become so important within regulatory and governmental 
circles. Two forms of risk regulation, namely risk based regulation and meta regulation are 
considered. As well as considering the application of both in jurisdictions such as the UK, the 
paper places greater focus in discussing the importance of meta regulation in jurisdictions 
such as Germany, Italy and the US. The preference for meta regulation is based on the 
premises, not only of the advantages considered in this paper but also on the application of 
Basel 11 in several jurisdictions. Whilst meta regulation also has its disadvantages, the 
impact of risk based regulation on the use of external auditors plays a part in the preference 
for meta regulation.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407191
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THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF RISK IN FINANCIAL REGULATION
Marianne  Ojo1
In his book, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, Beck (1992) illustrates the fact that 
“societies have become more reflexive about risk.”2 In many countries, even though there has 
been growing formalisation in that the regulatory and supervisory process is more statute and 
rules-based, emphasis has shifted not only from rules to risks, but also to management 
responsibilities. Regulation is often perceived as consisting of command and control strategies 
whereby the regulator imposes detailed rules with which the regulator monitors compliance.3
However, meta regulation is a type of regulatory strategy which draws firms into regulatory 
processes and attempts to both influence and make use of firms internal risk management and 
control strategies4 As a result, supervision is not so much about the simple monitoring of 
firms' compliance with regulatory rules but more about evaluating and monitoring firms' 
awareness of the risks created by their business and of their internal controls.5
In most countries however, different rules are applied to different types of financial 
businesses and these indicate the sectoral differences which exist in central business activities 
and risk exposures of these businesses.6 As an illustration, credit risk is the dominating risk 
for banking institutions since loans constitute the major share of assets which are typically 
known to exist within a bank.7 Even though balance sheets of individual bank institutions 
reveal differences, lending activities constitutes the core of the commercial banking business.8
Other classes of risk which are connected to the general business of commercial banking 
include liquidity and other market risks. 
Meta regulation can be described as the regulation of self-regulation.9 Meta risk regulation 
concerns the management of internal risk and being able to use the firms' own internal risk 
management systems to achieve regulatory objectives.10 The Basel II Capital Accord provides 
an example of the operation of meta regulation in that bank capitalisation is not to be imposed 
externally by regulators but will be determined by a bank's own internal risk management 
models provided these models are considered by regulators to be adequate.11 One major 
advantage of meta-risk regulation is that it should enable the regulator exploit the expertise of 
the industry in an age when the complexity and volatility of modern risk calls into question 
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3the ability of financial regulators to stay one step ahead.12 Another advantage of meta 
regulation is that it not only provides greater means of overcoming challenges associated with 
regulation, but also those problems of rigidity resulting from too many prescriptive rules.13
“Two well-known theoretical perspectives addressing the different explanations for why risk 
has become central, are termed “risk society” theory and “governmentality” theory.14 The 
“risk society” approach is one that identifies broad socio-economic and political changes 
which occurred in late modern societies. Along with these changes, loss of faith in institutions 
and authorities and a greater awareness of the limits and uncertainties linked to science and 
technology are identified.15 The term “governmentality” refers to specific types of 
government that have arisen in modern societies in line with liberalist and neo-liberalist 
approaches.16 It focuses on the exploration of how the identification of risks associated with 
certain behaviour or activities provide a way of exercising control over populations, groups or 
individuals in neo-liberal societies – in other words, identifying how risk is used as a “tool of 
governance” to shape behaviours”.17
Liberalisation and Conglomeration
In the liberalisation process of the 60s, 70s and early 80s, the most substantive reforms in 
financial services involved inter alia, the removal of controls on interest rates. A number of 
factors played their part in the early period of liberalisation namely: the blurring of the 
financial pillars – institutions carrying out banking activities pursuing activities which 
depended on investment dealers; financial innovation ; technological developments; macro-
economic developments which facilitated a more flexible financial system and a need for a 
more competitive environment.18
Ultimate liberalisation occurred since countries and their financial institutions realised that 
they were at a competitive disadvantage – as globalisation gained momentum. Regulators 
were not able to maximise their potential to regulate during the emergence of globalisation 
because they did not have the facility to adequately challenge the anti-competitive behaviour 
of the financial services industry. This was partly due to the asymmetric distribution of 
information between the industry being regulated and the primary regulator. This was notable 
in North America, the UK and Japan. In Germany and France where the financial sector was 
dominated by state ownership, the issue of asymmetry was not as important since banks were 
the dominant institutions in these countries – due to their universal bank structure.19
The decline of traditional banking, which has led many banks to venture into more profitable 
activities and the undermining of the role of banks, which resulted from commercial and 
industrial companies raising funds directly from markets, has also contributed to the blurring 
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4distinction between financial intermediaries.20 In Germany, the desire to provide a wide range 
of products corresponding with the concept of All finanz21 led to large banks adopting various 
strategies to enter the insurance sector.22 The Deutsche Bank, for instance, established its own 
life subsidiary, Dresdner Bank and embarked on establishing alliance with insurance 
companies such as Allianz.23 Commerzbank has also taken up a joint venture strategy.24 In the 
UK, building societies provided life insurance-based endowment mortgage, a key product in 
the sector.25 The mid 80s also saw the commencement of active sale of life insurance products 
produced by subsidiaries or allied companies of large clearing banks through their vast 
networks.26 In the 1990s, financial conglomerates already controlled a large market share and 
currently have 28% of bank deposits and 46% of the total insurance income in Britain.27
In the US, separation between banking and securities business as established by the Glass 
Steagall Act, has not only been gradually relaxed by allowing interpretations of the Act by the 
Federal Reserve Board, and other banking regulators through the 1980s, but has also been 
superseded by the Gramm Leach Bliley Act.28 The Gramm Leach Bliley Act removed the 
distinction between commercial banks and securities business. The early development of 
financial conglomerates which was restricted due to the functional separation of commercial 
banks and securities business resulted not only from the 1933 Glass Steagall Act but also from 
the National Bank Act of 1984, restrictions on branch banking imposed under the McFadden 
Act of 1927.29 Separation of banking from other commercial activities hindered the 
competitiveness of US banks on the international market scene and made it difficult for some 
non US financial groups to gain access to the US market.30 If such a group consisted of both 
bank and insurance companies, it could participate either in the banking or the insurance 
business.31
The need for a single regulator which regulates not just the banking sector, but also the 
insurance and securities sectors, has arisen principally because of the rise of conglomerate 
firms. Single regulators are able to manage more effectively cross sector services' risks. The 
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5adoption of the principle of consolidated supervision has enabled supervisors to assess more 
adequately the overall strength of a banking organisation and to monitor its susceptibility to 
risks based on the totality of its business, wherever conducted.32 Moreover, bank collapses 
such as BCCI revealed that consolidation into a single entity was important for purposes of 
regulating a bank.  Correspondingly, the functional overlaps between banking, insurance and 
securities business and their universal scope make it more difficult for a regulator to observe 
and comprehend such businesses.33 The difficulty of measuring and assessing risk within such 
institutions along with the speed with which assets can be adjusted in derivatives markets has 
led to more emphasis being placed on internal managerial control. 34 Consideration is also 
being given to the structures that can be put in place to re inforce the incentives of all parties 
involved – not just to management but all parties including auditors and regulators.35
Following the “Big Bang” in 1986, most of the leading stock exchange member firms were 
bought by UK merchant or clearing banks, overseas commercial or investment banks. This 
started the trend developing to the growth of financial conglomerates.36
Another contributory factor to conglomeration arises from the change in demographic 
structure and increased income in the OECD countries as public pension systems face 
pressure as a result of aging population.37 As a result, individuals with higher income have 
resorted to investing in additional pension schemes and other investment means to ensure 
security of their living standards after retirement.38 Insurance companies have responded to 
these changes in the environment by placing more emphasis on those products with savings or 
investment character and less emphasis on those products of an “income protection” character 
such as annuities and pensions.39
Factors such as the growth of financial conglomerates and the derivatives markets fuelled by 
the impact of information technology and increased competition have triggered a change in 
the way supervision is carried out around the globe. In addition, bank collapses have also 
contributed to a re-think in the structure of financial regulation, that is, the way in which 
financial regulation is carried out. Developments in the 1980s considerably blurred earlier 
distinctions between product and institutional structures and various financial services have 
become closer substitutes for each other.40 As traditional lines of demarcation between 
product and institutional structures became increasingly blurred, financial institutions also 
became exposed to new forms of competition.41 As a result of this resulting scope for 
competition, there was an awareness by financial intermediaries of the need to re-assess their 
overall business strategies in order to cope with changing demands of their clients, as well as 
seeking new profitable ventures.42 These events contributed to the growth of financial 
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6conglomerates. 
Importance of Risk
“Different explanations have been given as to why risk has become central across regulatory 
and governmental circles and these explanations are partly influenced by different approaches 
as to what risk is.43 One view in attempting to account for risk as a strategic organising 
principle in the public sector, attributes the specific needs of government.44 Political scientists, 
however suggest that the adoption of the language and practices of risk reflects a deeper, more 
complex process, one of “political isomorphism”.45 According to this view, risk becomes 
accepted and embedded in one organisation or institution such that it acquires recognition 
within other organisations and institutions.46 Other explanations, mainly from socio-cultural 
disciplines suggests that the importance of risk derives from issues related to control, 
accountability, responsibility and blame in late modern society.”47
Historically, systemic risk was considered to be more relevant for banks generally, and for 
large banks particularly than for non-bank financial institutions.48 The Basle Committee’s 
Core Principles49 states  that the primary task of bank supervision is “ to ensure that banks 
operate in a safe and sound manner and that they hold capital reserves sufficient to support 
risks that arise in their business”. According to the drafters of the Basel Core Principles, 
“Banking, by its nature, entails a wide array of risks. Banking supervisors need to understand 
these risks and be satisfied that banks are adequately measuring and managing them.”50 The 
Core Principles attempt to address the main risks encountered by banks in Principle Six which 
states that banking supervisors should set prudent and appropriate minimum capital adequacy 
requirements for all banks.51
The focus on risks by the Basel Core Principles is illustrated by the number of principles 
dedicated to risk related issues.
Principle 12 – Country and transfer risks: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have 
adequate policies and processes for identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling 
country risk and transfer risk in their international lending and investment activities, and for 
maintaining adequate provisions and reserves against such risks. 
Principle 13 – Market risks: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place policies 
and processes that accurately identify, measure, monitor and control market risks; supervisors 
should have powers to impose specific limits and/or a specific capital charge on market risk 
exposures, if warranted. 
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7Principle 14 – Liquidity risk: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have a liquidity 
management strategy that takes into account the risk profile of the institution, with prudent 
policies and processes to identify, measure, monitor and control liquidity risk, and to manage
liquidity on a day-to-day basis. Supervisors require banks to have contingency plans for 
handling liquidity problems. 
Principle 15 – Operational risk: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place risk 
management policies and processes to identify, assess, monitor and control/mitigate 
operational risk. These policies and processes should be commensurate with the size and 
complexity of the bank. 
Principle 16 – Interest rate risk in the banking book: Supervisors must be satisfied that 
banks have effective systems in place to identify, measure, monitor and control interest rate 
risk in the banking book, including a well defined strategy that has been approved by the 
Board and implemented by senior management; these should be appropriate to the size and 
complexity of such risk.
As stated earlier, over the years, there has been a growing number of large, internationally 
active financial groups which operate in several financial sectors. Financial convergence has 
assumed a number of different forms. As well as cross sectoral investments and cross 
distribution, convergence is also taking place through cross sector risk transfers.52
Commercial banks, along with their investment and securities branches, have become users of 
products such as credit derivatives and other hedging instruments which are used as means of 
off-loading specific credit risk exposures.53 As revealed by data from the US Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, end-sellers of credit risk protection are usually large commercial 
banks, insurance companies, collateral managers of collateralized bond obligations, pension 
funds and mutual funds.54 Whilst commercial banks, hedge funds and to lesser extent non-
financial companies, appear to be end buyers, banks and securities firms function as 
intermediaries – it is not possible to distinguish banks’ participation as intermediaries from 
their direct involvement as end-buyers or sellers.55 However, according to the Bank of 
England’s Financial Stability Review, is seems on average, that credit risk is being transferred 
from the banking sector to insurance companies and investment funds, mainly through 
portfolio transactions.56
As a result, new forms of risk have accompanied the changes in relation to financial 
structures, which have taken place over the years. Whilst individual entities could appear 
risky and the entire organization well-diversified or hedged, risks which did not appear at the 
level of individual entities could exist at the group level.57 Risks identified with integrated 
financial services groups include lack of transparency owing to complex intra-group 
exposures, the risk of contagion as a result of non-existent or ineffective firewalls, multiple 
gearing risk, problems emanating from unregulated group members, the possibility of 
regulatory arbitrage occurring within financial services groups which involve more than one 
type of institution.58
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8The Impact of Risk-Based Regulation as a  “tool of governance” on Behaviors of 
Regulators in the UK, Germany, Italy and the US.
The supervision and monitoring of management performance and ensuring accountability of 
management to shareholders and other stakeholders constitute the two key aspects of 
corporate governance.59
The UK
Whilst the contested nature of risk, the values attached to it, and the likelihood of different 
interpretative frameworks have raised questions about the ability of risk to carry the weight of 
expectations attached to its as a regulatory tool60, relating risks to its objectives enables the 
FSA to establish a boundary around its regulatory role.61
Impact of Risk-Based Supervision
With the FSA under its risk-based approach dedicating more resources to the supervision of 
insurers, the extent of the involvement of external auditors in the supervision process is of 
considerable interest.62
Overall, the FSA's risk based approach has led to a reduced role for auditors in banking 
supervision.63 Since the date of implementation of the FSMA known as N2,64 there have been 
84 skilled person reports of which the Enforcement Division has initiated only six.65 From 1 
April 2003 to 31 March 2004, the FSA exercised its power under section 166 of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 to require firms to produce a skilled person's report in 28 
situations.66 This figure dropped to 17 in 2005/06 and 18 in 2006/07.67 This is a considerable 
reduction in investigations from the number of reporting accountants commissioned under 
section 39 Banking Act 1987 which frequently exceeded 600 reports annually.68
Impact of Meta Regulation
Legal and General Assurance Society v FSA highlighted how the more holistic focus which 
meta regulation has on systemic failures on the part of firms, rather than their specific acts or 
omissions, is starting to influence the ways of approaching issues of causation in the 
framework of regulatory responsibility.
In contrast to the FSA’s use of holistic approaches, to fact finding to establish regulatory 
responsibility and the Tribunal’s acknowledgement in Legal and General Assurance Society v 
FSA, of the need to do so, in Lloyds TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd and others v Lloyds 
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an overly holistic approach to establishing the “cause” of regulatory responsibility for the 
purposes of determining civil liability as between the insured and insurer under an insurance 
contract.
The Financial Services Authority operates on a risk-based approach whereby it differentiates 
between regulated institutions and allocates resources to areas of greater perceived risk.69  It 
identifies three sources of risk namely:70 The external environment ; consumer and industry-
wide risks and the regulated institutions themselves. The risk-based approach operates on two 
levels: at an organisation level, and at the firm level which is articulated in the ‘firm risk 
assessment framework’71 Referred to as the ARROW framework (Advanced Risk-Responsive 
Operating Framework) by the FSA and its staff, the approach is not focused on compliance 
with the prudential requirements that exist within the Interim Prudential Source Book or the 
Handbook Guidelines, but encapsulates risks that exist externally and internally in the 
financial services industry.72 It takes into specific consideration the interests of wider 
stakeholders such depositors, investors and other financial intermediaries, as well as its own 
interests and compliance with its statutory objectives and principles.73
The FSA, being a risk-based regulator, has to make difficult choices about how it deploys its 
enforcement resources, as with its other resources.74 A consequence of its risk-based approach 
is that more of its supervisory resources will be devoted to its supervision priorities and, 
within this framework, to the larger financial firms and groups.75
When firms are contacted by the FSA, they automatically assume that, because they have 
been selected, it means that the FSA has already decided that there is a problem in that firm -
which is not the case.76 The decision to select a firm takes into account a number of factors 
such as the number and type of firms which are active in the market or product that the FSA is 
interested in; the desire to find a sample of firms that is representative of the various different 
sizes or structures in the market the FSA is considering; the desire to create a representative 
sample which includes some firms which the FSA considers are likely to set the highest 
standards in terms of systems and controls and practices in that area.77 The sample may also 
include some firms about whose practices the FSA has concerns and how the FSA can most 
efficiently use its resources to obtain sufficiently information for its needs.78
The combination of more resources being committed to priority areas and the application of 
the FSA's risk-based approach to enforcement may give rise to an external perception of 
unfairness or ‘rough justice’.79 Any firm which believes its standards to have been no 
different to those of its peers may be aggrieved if enforcement actions are imposed on it while 
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its peers are not sanctioned.80
The approach taken by the risk supervisory process to flesh out decisions and show how they 
are arrived at as regards resource allocation between different sectors of the financial services 
industry improves transparency and thereby provides a form of accountability mechanism as 
government can gauge how efficiently the FSA is utilising its resources to achieve its 
objectives.81
It is important to distinguish between risk and uncertainty.82  “Risk is traditionally associated 
with probability calculation and this suggests that an event can be predicted and controlled.83
Uncertainty however is not capable of measurement and deals with possibilities incapable of 
calculation which are based on guesswork and judgment”.84
There are four elements to the FSA's response to risk namely :85 (i) Diagnostic : To identify, 
assess and measure risks ; (ii) Monitoring : To track the development of identified risks; (iii) 
Preventative : To limit or reduce identified risks and prevent them from crystallising or 
increasing and (iv) Remedial : To respond to risks when they have crystallized. Six principal 
regulatory tools in this response are as follows :86 An authorisation process – led by the 
Threshold Conditions for authorisation; The approval of individuals – applying fit and 
proper person criteria; Supervision -where the regulators monitor authorised business; 
Enforcement – of the regulatory rules and penalising transgressors; Publicity – highlighting 
areas of concern to the industry and consumers and Education – Forewarning or forearming 
investors.
The FSA states in its risk assessment framework that it functions to measure firm risks 
differently to the way firms normally manage risk.87 The FSA's operating framework has also 
been designed to link its statutory objectives with its regulatory activities.. 88  Risk, in 
particular risk to its four statutory objectives, is now used as the determinant for all regulatory 
activity, including overall strategy and development.89 It has the following stages :90
 Identifying the risks to the statutory objectives
 Assessing and then prioritising the risks : The FSA will first assess the effect of the 
collapse or lapse of conduct of a firm on the industry as a whole, on public perception and 
market confidence and on retail consumers, considering the availability of compensation 
or redress for them.
 It will then consider the probability of a problem occurring by considering factors such as 
business risk, external context and the firm's business strategy and decisions.
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 The FSA then prioritises its regulatory position by “multiplying” the impact of the 
problem (if it occurs) by the probability of the problem occurring.91
 Having completed these assessments, the FSA, taking into account the resources at its 
disposal, will decide on its regulatory response.
Reasons for the FSA's risk based framework relate to uncertainty not only from the challenges 
of regulation but  an increasingly complex and global financial environment, public 
expectation that the regulator would clean up the industry and by political demands for a safe 
but innovative and globally competitive industry.92 It is quite implicit in any risk-based 
regime with limited resources that priority will be given to the greatest risks – hence not all 
risks will be addressed.93 Relating risks to its objectives also enables the FSA to establish a 
boundary around its regulatory role.94 This boundary allows it to justify the exclusion or 
limitation of other roles such as that of regulating for distributive goals.95
Firms remain the main focus of regulatory activity and as a result, immense attention is given 
to identifying the risks-to-objectives that they might pose.96 This process involves an 
assessment of the impact that a firm's failure or lapse of perspective will have on the FSA's 
objectives.97 The scoring process is mainly based on balance sheet information supplied by 
the firm and on this basis firms are scored into one of four categories: low, medium-low, 
medium-high, high.98 Generally, low impact firms will not be subject to a full risk assessment 
and will receive less intensive monitoring.99
Just as risk is used as a technology of governance in relation to firms, it is also used in relation 
to consumers – in particular, to private citizen consumers of financial services.100 At first 
instance, the specific statutory objective to achieve “an appropriate degree of protection for 
the consumer” suggests that the regulator should take a proactive, protectionist role –
however, this statutory objective is governed by statutory principles which require the FSA to 
recognise the different types of risks involved in different transactions as well as the general 
principle that consumers should take responsibility for their own decisions (“caveat 
emptor”).101
The FSA has identified four principal risks that consumers may face namely: prudential risk, 
bad faith risk; complexity/unsuitability risk and performance risk.102 It has also made it clear 
that in pursuing a risk-to-objectives approach it will not guarantee a zero-failure regime.103
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FSA attempts to portray citizens as proactive and risk-aware consumers who seek the opportunity to secure 
their financial future through participation in financial markets and who accept responsibility for the results 
of the choices they make.
101 ibid
102 Ibid p 48
103 Ibid : Firms will be allowed to fail with resulting consumer loss.
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Germany
Risk-Based Regulation and Supervision in Germany
The importance of risk-related information as a vital component of companies' annual reports  
when performing operating and financial reviews (OFRs) of listed companies was highlighted 
in a report aimed at inquiring into the arrangements for financial regulation of public limited 
companies in the UK.104 This ensued from the realisation that traditional financial statements, 
no matter how well constructed, would not always provide sufficient information for analysts 
and investors.105
As part of the implementation of the Financial Conglomerates Directive, section 25 a (1) was 
amended in the last quarter of 2004.106 The implementation of the European Financial 
Conglomerates Directive into German Law took effect on the 1st Jan 2005 and it requires 
clearly for a strategy whereby the institution's ability to manage risks as part of a proper 
business organisation is taken into account107.
The adoption of a risk based approach to financial regulation and supervision in Germany has 
been prompted by the significance of financial conglomerates.108 Financial conglomerates 
have significant influence on financial stability particularly when they have a notable level of 
market share in several financial sectors and gain increasing significance in the market as a 
result of their size.109 The objectives of the Financial Conglomerates Directive interalia 
includes ensuring the sound supervision of additional risks associated with financial groups 
who are involved in cross-sector financial activities.110 It also encourages member states to 
develop their standards for limits on risk concentrations or permit their national supervisors to 
do so until there is further coordination.111
The implementation of the EU Financial Conglomerates Directive in Germany considers the 
growing economic importance of financial conglomerates and for the first time, supervisors 
now have a weapon in overcoming risks to the financial system attributed to financial 
conglomerates.112 The Bundesbank's significant involvement in financial conglomerates' 
reporting enhances its ability to assess risks to enterprises within a conglomerate and the risks 
to financial stability attributed to financial conglomerates.113
Despite the Bundesbank's involvement, supervisors are still challenged by the fact that 
sectoral supervisory requirements address the relevant risks differently and that there is still 
no integrated approach to cross-sector supervision of equivalent risks.114 Supervisors are 
therefore still largely confining themselves to a form of monitoring that informs them about 
                                               
104 See House of Commons  - Treasury – Minutes  of Evidence , House of Commons Environmental Audit, 
Fourth Report  13 March 2007 Session 2006/2007 < 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmenvaud/227/22702.htm> (last visited 22nd
August 2007)
105 ibid
106 NO Angermueller, M Eichhorn and T Ramke, 'New Standards of Banking Supervision – A Look at the 
German Implementation Approach for the Second Pillar of Basel II'  2005 (2) Journal of International 
Banking Law and Regulation 52; Section 25 (a) deals with  particular organisational duties of institutions
107 See also Deutsche Bundesbank,  'Supervision of Financial Conglomerates in Germany' Monthly Report 
(April 2005) 39
108 Ibid p 44
109 Ibid pp 45,46
110 Ibid p 48
111 Ibid p 51,52
112 Ibid p 55
113 Ibid ; also see Deutsche Bundesbank,  'The Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision' 
Monthly Report (September 2000)
114   See Deutsche Bundesbank,  'Supervision of Financial Conglomerates in Germany' Monthly Report (April 
2005)  p 55
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risk concentrations and intra-group transactions but does not yet set integrated supervisory 
upper limits across all sectors - which appears reasonable115.
It is therefore important, prior to creating more extensive supervisory standards, to compile 
information and gather experience based on incoming reports. Arrangements to resolve or at 
least disclose conflicts of interest resulting from business activity in different financial sectors 
have also not been reached.116 The focus of the supervision of companies belonging to a 
financial conglomerate remains on individual supervision that is supplemented, but not 
overrided, by rules governing group-wide supervision (solo-plus approach).117
Has the Approach to Risk-based Regulation influenced the Degree of involvement of 
External Auditors  in Germany? 
Bundesbank and German Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin): Statistics ongoing 
banking supervision118
Ongoing banking supervision operations, Number of operations conducted
Item 2002 2003 2004
¹ Revised from the previous year. Source: Deutsche Bundesbank
Individual reports pursuant to sections 13 to 14 of the Banking Act
206 
971
153 
035
186 
754
Single borrowers included in the summary reports submitted pursuant 
to sections 13 to 14 of the Banking Act
2 
314
292
1 
832 
038
2 
126 
336
Reports pursuant to sections 24 and 24a of the Banking Act
47 
585
44 
561
47 
002
Monthly returns pursuant to section 25 and 25a of the Banking Act
42 
992
40 
918
38 
558
Reports on the volume of foreign lending (country risk) pursuant to 
section 25 (3) of the Banking Act
270 370 912
Auditors' reports on annual accounts
3 
378
3 
263
3 
253
Reports on the auditing of safe custody accounts 614 483 644
Routine, special and deposit guarantee fund auditors' reports
1 
887
1 
755
1 
678
                                               
115 ibid
116 ibid
117 ibid
118 Source : <http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_bafin_fenster.en.php>
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Item 2002 2003 2004
Audits pursuant to sections 44 and 44c of the Banking Act 69 79 155
Auditors' reports on the special funds of investment companies
1 
431
1 
309
1 
459
Reports from investment companies on their activities
6 
635
6 
891
6 
606
Reports under Principle I
32 
846
29
923
28 
907
Reports under Principle II
31 
617
28 
990
27 
789
Audits of internal risk models 8 9 6
Reports under the Capital Accord of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision
76 76 81
From the statistics on ongoing banking supervision, it can be seen that although auditors' 
reports on annual accounts, routine special and deposit guarantee fund auditors' reports have 
decreased, audits pursuant to sections 44 and 44c of the Banking Act, auditors' reports on the 
special funds of investment companies have increased. Particularly notable is the significant 
increase in sections 44 and 44c audits pursuant to the Banking Act. Between 2002 and 2004, 
these audits have more than doubled.
From this, it can be inferred that the adoption of risk based regulation in financial supervision 
in Germany has overall, not resulted to a reduction in its use of external auditors. The growing 
importance of risk-based regulation is also highlighted through risk-oriented reporting as it 
now represents a significant component of standard disclosure requirements and credit 
institutions must not only explain their assets and other elements but also outline their own 
risk situation and their ability to manage these risks.119 The growing importance of using 
external auditors is also demonstrated through the Basel Committee's recommendations120 and 
certain post Enron reforms.121  It is therefore difficult to establish which is of greater 
importance – whether it is risk-based regulation or the use of external auditors. 
The Impact of Basel II on German Banking Supervision
It was expected that the new Basel Capital Accord would result to a shift as on-site 
prudential audits assumed greater importance within the supervisory review process 
and came to supplement the evaluation of reports and returns from institutions.122  This 
seems to be reflected in the above table of statistics on ongoing supervision. Basel II has three 
                                               
119 See Deutsche Bundesbank, 'New Transparency Rules for Credit Institutions' Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly 
Report (October 2005) p 69
120 Basel Committee's Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision and the Relationship between Banking 
Supervisors and Banks' External Auditors , International Auditing Practices Committee
121 See Deutsche Bundesbank,  'The Evolution of Accounting Standards for Credit Institutions, Deutsche 
Bundesbank Monthly Report (June 2002) p 39
122 Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision  Monthly Report 
(September 2000) p 37 
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pillars namely : Minimum capital requirements, supervisory review process and market 
discipline. Even though the past years have concentrated on pillar 1, pillar 2 presents a great 
challenge for banks and supervisory agencies.123  In October 1995, following the collapse of 
Barings Bank, which was attributed to inadequate control mechanisms, organisation and risk 
management, BaFin's predecessor, the Bundesaufsichtsamt fuer das Kreditwesen circulated 
the statement on “minimum requirements for the trading activities of credit institutions”.124
BaFin gave an official statement regarding the implementation of Pillar 2 on the 15th April 
2004.125 The foundation for this is a new circular called MaRisk ( minimum requirements for 
risk management).126  
Pillars 1 and 3 are to be covered by the new solvency directive Solvenzverordnung. Section 10 
(1b) of the German Banking Act will be amended with regards to pillar 2.127 Pillar 2 not only 
seeks to ensure that banks have adequate capital to support all the risks related to their 
activities, but also encourages banks to develop and implement better risk management 
techniques in monitoring and managing their risks.128
Basel II goes beyond the current German bank regulations – as a result there are not only 
inconsistencies, but also gaps between the regulations.129 When comparing the minimum 
requirements for the credit business of credit institutions (MaK) with Basel II Internal Risk 
Based approaches, in detail, it is evident that requirements for IRB approaches are beyond 
those of the MaK.130 As a result of its higher sophistication, those ratings which fulfil IRB 
requirements will also fulfill MaK requirements but the reverse is not the same.131
The minimum requirements for risk management ( MaRisk) combines the minimum 
requirements for the credit business of credit institutions (MaK), MaH and MaIR.132 As well 
as paving way for more holistic regulation, this merger should prevent further risk classes 
specified in the New Basel  Capital Accord.133
Italy
Risk Based Approach to  Bank Supervision in Italy
Supervisory activities aimed at increasing the capitalisation of banks – particularly major ones 
and to manage their risks of large exposures became more of a regular practice in 2001.134
Methods for certifying banks’ internal models for market risk calculation and related capital 
charges were also established.135
                                               
123 NO Angermueller, M Eichhorn and T Ramke, 'New Standards of Banking Supervision – A Look at the 
German Implementation Approach for the Second Pillar of Basel II' (2005) 2 Journal of International 
Banking Law and Regulation  45
124 Ibid p 47
125 ibid
126 ibid
127 Ibid p 52
128 ibid p 55
129 ibid 
130 ibid 52
131 ibid pp 52,52
132 ibid p 54
133 ibid p 55
134 See  'Supervision of Banks and Other Intermediaries:  Banking Supervision”, Bank of Italy at p  205 
<http://www.bancaditalia.it/vigilanza_tutela/vig_ban/pubblicazioni/rela/2001/Supervision.pdf> last visited 
Jan 20 2007
135 ibid
16
The Bank of Italy is taking measures to implement the new Basle Capital Accord.136 In 
accordance with the EU’s Capital Adequacy Directives 2006/48 and 2006/49 on the taking up 
and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and the capital adequacy of investment firms 
and credit institutions respectively, the so-called Basle II capital-adequacy principles will take 
effect as from January 1st 2007. The exception will be for financial institutions adopting more 
sophisticated methods of risk calculation, who will be allowed to adopt the principles on 
January 1st 2008. Although the EU will apply Basle rules to all banks and investment firms, 
and not just to those that are internationally active as required by the Basle Accord, a number 
of adjustments have been made to incorporate EU specifications and to make life easier for 
smaller firms. There are areas where national discretion may be exercised. There will be 
lower capital requirements in the EU rules for banks venture-capital business in order not to 
put excessive dampers on finance for start-ups, given that these are regarded as crucial for the 
future growth and competitiveness of the EU. This directive will introduce a common 
regulatory approach to securitisation across the EU for the first time. The Bank of Italy was 
still consulting with Italian financial institutions as of end-July 2006 on details relating to the 
Italian legislation for the purposes of transposing EU directives into national legislation.
In the area of credit risk, low- and medium-risk investment firms will be able to continue 
using the existing expenditure-based rules for credit risk, though they will have to divide their 
exposures into a larger number of classes. This will be known as the standardised approach. 
The more sophisticated approach for other financial institutions uses the internal ratings-
based (IRB) method based on the Basel agreement, but will comprise foundation and 
advanced approaches. Less complex institutions will be able to mix the less and more 
sophisticated methodologies.
There will be similar flexibility in addressing operational risk, consisting of three levels: 
the basic indicator approach, the standardised approach, and the advanced 
measurement approach (AMA)137. These levels reflect the increasing levels of risk 
sensitivity. The standard definition of operational risk as agreed to by the Risk Management 
Group of the Basel Committee and industry representatives is “ the risk of loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events.”138 This 
definition includes legal risk and excludes strategic and reputational risk and depends on the 
classification of operational risks according to the underlying causes139. Other important 
operational risk issues currently encountered by banks include business-continuity planning, 
the role of internal and external audits, the outsourcing of business functions and electronic 
banking.140 Since 2001, the Basel Committee's Risk Management Group has been carrying 
out surveys of banks' operational loss data with the aim of obtaining information on the 
sector's operational risk experience and also with a view to refining the capital framework.141
                                               
136 Ibid
137   The basic approach is founded on a fixed percentage of gross income, the standardised approach extends the 
basic approach by breaking down banks' activities into components' and the advanced measurement approach 
is based on the adoption of banks' internal models. See M Moscadelli, 'The Modelling of Operational Risk: 
Experience with the Analysis of Data collected by the Basel Committee' (July 2004) Banca D'Italia Temi di 
Discussione del Servizio Studi Bank of Italy, Banking Supervision Department Number 517/2004
138 ibid p 10
139 ibid
140 D Quiroz Rendon, 'The Formal Regulatory Approach to Banking Regulation' Badell and Grau Legal 
Consultants ; also see <http://www.badellgrau.com/legalbanking.html> (last visited 10 June 2007)
141 See M Moscadelli, 'The Modelling of Operational Risk: Experience with the Analysis of Data collected by 
the Basel Committee' (July 2004)  Banca D'Italia Temi di Discussione del Servizio Studi Bank of Italy, 
Banking Supervision Department Number 517/2004  p 10
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The Bank of Italy checked the state of preparedness of Italy’s eight largest banking groups in 
2005 and concluded that management was well aware of the imminence of the changes and 
that statistical systems were adequate. However, it identified a need for improvements in the 
quality of data and in IT systems for modelling.
There will be a single consolidating supervisor through which cross border groups will 
channel applications to use the IRB and AMA methodologies. Decisions will be made within 
six months by the different supervisors acting together.
The US
Risk Based Supervision in the US
The Federal Reserve also operates according to a risk-focussed method of supervision which 
was adopted not only as a result of the ever growing size and complexity of banks, but also 
because of the continuity inherent in its nature – as opposed to a point-in-time examination.142
The risk based approach was also introduced following the 'savings and loans' debacle of the 
late 1980s and 1990s.143 The risk-based supervision process aims to ascertain the greatest 
risks to a banking organisation and evaluate the ability of the organisation’s management to 
identify, measure, monitor and control those risks.144 Businesses which have the potential to 
produce the greatest risks form the main focus of examination carried out by Federal Reserve 
examiners.145 The risk management component consists of four sub components which 
indicate the effectiveness of the banking organisation’s risk management and controls namely: 
Board and senior management oversight; Policies, procedures and limits; Risk monitoring 
management information systems and  Internal controls.146 According to Alan Greenspan, a 
combination of improved risk management and the utilisation of financial derivatives to 
manage the risk portfolio has enabled banks to calculate risks more efficiently in business, 
which in turn has resulted to a reduction of the burden of the banking system on its 
regulators.147
The move towards a risk-based approach is an attempt to realign bank regulation and 
supervision with the commercial realities faced by banks and this involved institutions 
managing their risks in a more efficient way to reflect the increase in modes of obtaining 
finance for business and also to hedge risks.148 The risk based approach in the USA 
concentrates on both small 'community banks' and 'large banks' and the mode of supervision 
has developed in distinct ways as a result of the existence of more than one bank regulator at 
the federal level.149
The risk based approach consolidates on the extent to which a risk could adversely affect the 
safety and soundness of a bank.150 Benefits of the OCC's risk based approach include:151 Core 
                                               
142 The Federal Reserve System Purposes and Functions p 63
143 D Singh 'Legal Aspects of Prudential Supervision' 2007 p 127
144 The Federal Reserve System Purposes and Functions p 63
145 ibid
146 ibid
147 A Greenspan,  ‘Banking’, Federal Reserve Bulletin, 7 October (2002)
148 D Singh, Bank Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets:The Legal Aspects of Prudential Supervision
2007 p 129
149 ibid  
150 ibid p 130; The OCC sets out its policy on supervision of national banks in its Comptrollers Handbooks of 
1996 and 2001. It emphasises that the supervisory process does not seek to restrict risk taking but that it 
expects banks to maintain such risk taking by having appropriate risk management processes available to 
capture those risks. Also see  OCC Large Bank Supervision, Comptrollers Handbook, (2001) at p. 3
151 D Singh, Bank Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets:The Legal Aspects of Prudential Supervision
18
assessment criteria which assist the OCC in its application of a common methodology to 
evaluate the risk profile of individual group entities to ensure that risks can be measured 
consistently and ; the forward looking and proactive nature of the OCC's approach which 
enables it to gauge how risks will change over the next 12 months.
Impact of Basel II on US Financial Regulation and Supervision
Basel II is important not only because it is a common standard for measuring capital adequacy 
but also because it is based on the risks of an institution’s investments.152 It therefore allows 
for greater facilitation of harmonisation and easier comparisons between different countries, 
particularly at a time when globalisation and the increase of multinational firms has made this 
necessary. The risk based capital standards not only mandate institutions that assume greater 
risk to have higher levels of capital but also take into consideration risks associated with 
operations that are not included on a bank’s balance sheet, such as those risks resulting from 
obligations to make loans.153 Basel II has been pursued by the Federal Reserve due to the 
increasing inadequacies of Basel I regulatory capital rules particularly in the context of the 
growing complexity of products and services provided by large internationally active 
banks.154 A more risk-capital framework has been called for and it is believed that Basel II 
would provide such framework for such internationally active banks.155 As banking involves 
the acceptance and management of risks, it is of great importance that bank supervisors  
ensure that an adequate level of capital is maintained to insulate itself against potential losses. 
Minimum regulatory capital requirements are vital to ensuring that such protection is 
facilitated.156
On the 25th of September, 2006, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury 
(OCC); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board); Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC); and Office of Thrift Supervision, Treasury (OTS), which are 
collectively known as the Agencies, issued a notice of proposed rule making ( NPR or 
proposed rule).157 This notice welcomes comments on the New Advanced Capital Adequacy 
Framework that will replace the present general risk-based capital standards which have been 
applied to large, internationally active US banks.158 The proposed framework would also 
implement the “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards : A 
Revised Framework,” which was published in June 2004 by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (Basel II) in the US.159  Basel II consists of three pillars namely: capital adequacy 
requirements, centralized supervision and market discipline.
                                                                                                                                                  
2007 p 131
152 The Federal Reserve System, Purposes and Functions p 73
153 ibid
154 See 'An Update on Basel II Implementation in the US', 'Reasons for Basel II',  'Remarks by Governor Susan 
Schmidt Bies at the Global Association of Risk Professionals Basel II Summit, New York, February 27 2007 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2007/20070226/default.htm> last visited February 27 
2007
155 ibid
156 ibid
157 See 'Proposed  Supervisory Guidance for Internal Ratings-Based Systems for Credit Risk, Advanced 
Measurement Approaches for Operational Risk, and the Supervisory Review Process (Pillar 2) Related to 
Basel II Implementation. 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2007/20070215/attachment.pdf> last visited 20th
February 2007
158 ibid
159 Ibid; Even though Basel II lists various possible approaches for calculating regulatory risk-based capital 
requirements under Pillar 1, the US has proposed only the advanced approaches for implementation. 
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In relation to Pillar 1, the proposed framework as described in the NPR, would require some 
qualifying banks and permit others to calculate their regulatory risk-based capital 
requirements using an internal ratings-based (IRB) approach for credit risk and the advanced 
measurement approaches (AMA) for operational risk.160 As well as giving guidelines for the 
supervisory review process and requiring a process for the supervisory review of capital 
adequacy under Pillar 2, the NPR also highlights requirements for improved public 
disclosures under Pillar 3.161
Three documents lay out the proposed supervisory guidance for implementing proposed 
revisions to the risk-based capital standards in the US and this new capital framework would 
be compulsory for large internationally active US banking organisations and optional for 
other institutions.162 Two of these documents relate to the Basel II advanced approaches for 
calculating risk-based capital requirements namely, the advanced internal ratings-based (IRB) 
approach for credit risk and the advanced measurement approaches (AMA) for operational 
risk.163 Under the IRB framework, internal estimates of certain risk components would be 
used as key inputs by banks in determining their regulatory risk-based capital requirement for 
credit risk.164 As well as updating and consolidating previously proposed supervisory 
guidance on corporate and retail exposures, the IRB Guidance also provides new guidance on 
systems which a bank may require in order to distinguish risks posed by other types of credit 
exposure.165
The second guidance document provides supervisory guidance on the AMA for operational 
risk and updates the proposed AMA Guidance published in 2003.166 The third document, 
issued for the first time, sets out proposals for guidance on the Basel II supervisory review 
process for assessing capital adequacy.167
Conclusion
Meta Risk regulation: The Way Forward?
Compliance will always remain vital in determining the success of meta regulation. In order 
to ensure the least deviation between what is expected of a firm and its actual compliance 
with rules, the issue of monitoring will therefore, be crucial. Whilst enforced self regulation (a 
form of meta regulation), provides the benefits of flexibility derived from self regulation, it 
also attempts to avoid the weaknesses of its voluntary nature. In considering more ambiguous 
factors such as the external environment of the firm, the risk based approach to supervision 
                                               
160 Ibid; The internal ratings -based approach and advanced measurement approaches are both known as the 
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161 ibid
162 See 'Agencies Seek Public Comment on Proposed Supervisory Guidance for Basel II' 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2007/20070215/default.htm>
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164 See 'Proposed  Supervisory Guidance for Internal Ratings-Based Systems for Credit Risk, Advanced 
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would appear to produce less accurate results than meta regulation. Furthermore its impact on 
the use of external auditors, as illustrated by the Financial  Services Authority (FSA), 
contributes to its being a less favorable option than meta regulation. 
According to Fiona Haynes168, meta regulation “with its collaborative approach to rule 
generation”, could controversially be considered to be the approach with greatest evolvement 
when considered in relation to other approaches such as co-regulation, enforced self 
regulation and process or management-based regulation. Meta regulation is a method which is 
capable of managing “self regulatory capacity” within those sites being regulated whilst
exercising governmental discretion in stipulating the goals and levels of risk reduction to be 
achieved in regulation.169
Meta risk regulation is proposed as a means of quantifying and managing risks under the risk 
society theory – risks which I would like to refer to as institutional risks. Such a proposal 
would not only address, to an extent, the concerns of Beck (in relation to matters of 
accountability), but would also be a more appropriate means of controlling more complex 
risks which have resulted from developments of science and technology. Such risks can be 
contrasted with the more “traditional and novel societal risks”. Enforced Self Regulation is 
proposed as a means of addressing such less complex and more traditional forms of risk –
whilst providing some scope for the role of judicial governance and the involvement of courts. 
Courts are simply not adequately equipped to deal with the pace with which some financial 
instruments, such as derivatives, operate. Even though the Capital Requirements Directive 
had provided for increased pro cyclicality, it came into force after the 2007/08 Financial 
Crises had practically ended – thus making it impossible for it to have any impact on the 
Crisis. As a result, the role of courts and judicial governance in risk regulation should 
constitute a topic for purposes of future research. Furthermore, the theory of risk colonisation 
which involves the dynamic linkage between societal and institutional risks, as propounded 
by Rothstein et al, and within this context,170 would constitute a fertile ground for research.
The ability of responsive regulation to address such a complex171 factor as risk, its flexibility 
and responsiveness to regulatees and its environment, among other advantages, make it a 
more desirable regulatory tool than traditional regulation or risk based regulation. Whilst 
direct monitoring by the State would be required, the involvement of third parties such as non 
government organisations would also be crucial to ensuring that a situation, whereby the State
could be captured, is avoided. Furthermore the possibilities available in achieving the right 
“regulatory mix” make it a promising regulatory tool. Even though the contested nature of 
risk contributes to the difficulty of relying on risk as a regulatory tool, its presence and ever 
growing significance cannot be ignored – hence the need for a form of regulation which is 
able to manage risk more effectively and which would best suit an evolving regulatory 
environment.
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